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Put your message in a modem
1
And throw it in the Cyber Sea

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the risk of stating the obvious, electronic gadgets and digital
media are ubiquitous in our modern world. Perhaps it seems that
both the animate and inanimate objects around us have been
reduced to digitized ones and zeros: from e-books to movies,
spreadsheets to GPSs, music to family photos, dating to job-seeking,
diaries to recipes, auctions to education, and stock-trading to
holiday cards. People lumber around halls and sidewalks, staring at
digital devices, texting, checking the weather, listening to music,
seemingly oblivious to the physical world around them. In 2007, it
was reported that the world created more electronic documents in
the year prior than the documents in all the years combined since
2
Gutenberg invented the printing press. By then, at least ninety3
three percent of all new information was created digitally, and, of
all electronically stored information (“ESI”), at least thirty percent
4
would never be printed out. In May 2011, the online merchant
Amazon.com announced that its sales of electronic books overtook
5
sales of printed books. Meanwhile, the President has decreed the
growing number of cyber security threats is “one of the most
serious economic and national security challenges we face as a
6
The volume of data breaches, mostly consisting of
nation.”
hacking and malware, is at the highest level ever, according to a
1.
2.

RUSH, Virtuality, on TEST FOR ECHO (Atlantic Records 1996).
William E. Mooz, Jr., Technology Tips for Reducing EDD Review Costs, 24
LEGAL TECH NEWSL., no.12, Mar. 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://www
.catalystsecure.com/images/crs/articles/Technology_Tips_0307.pdf (noting the
great increase in data as a result of new technologies and its effect on litigation).
3. James Larue et al., Trails from the Aether: Cyber-Evidence, in 54.1 STATE BAR
OF TEXAS 33RD ANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE 1, 1 (2007), available at
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/6367/110331_01.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, E-Books Outsell Print Books at Amazon,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/technology
/20amazon.html.
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our
Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-CyberInfrastructure/.
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7

2011 joint report by Verizon and the U.S. Secret Service. As one
commentator wryly observed, “Hardly a month has gone by this
year without a multinational company such as Google Inc. . . . ,
EMC Corp. or Sony Corp. . . . disclosing it’s been hacked by cyber
8
intruders who infiltrated networks or stole customer information.”
Likewise, hardly a week goes by without a prominent figure
becoming embroiled in a scandal because of a social media
9
misstep.
Societal trends, such as the foregoing, invariably manifest
10
themselves in legal controversies, and, as a consequence thereof,
new fields of expertise such as “ethical hacking” and cloud
11
forensics are emerging. These trends have led to “a huge
demand” for highly educated specialists in the discipline of digital
12
Consequently, lawyers have been—in both litigation
forensics.
support and law practice management—increasingly encountering
13
And, although
or relying upon digital forensics experts.
education in this emerging discipline has focused largely on its
14
technical aspects, there are significant legal and ethical challenges
7. Wade Baker et al., 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON, 6
(2011), http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach
-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf.
8. Michael Riley et al., Cyber Cops Stymied by Anonymity in Tracking Google, Sony
Hacks, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2011-06-07/google-sony-nintendo-hacker-anonymity-stymies-arrests-by-u-s-cybercops.html.
9. See, e.g., Christian Boone, Embarassing Online Exchanges Becoming Political
Scandal Du Jour, AJC, June 6, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/news/embarrassing-onlineexchanges-becoming-969042.html.
10. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as
a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 BYU L. REV. 89 (1975) (positing that the
law is simultaneously a means of social control, a means of facilitating human
interaction, and the realization of reciprocal expectancies).
11. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO.
1121-0329, SOLICITATION: ELECTRONIC CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE RECOVERY
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000957.pdf
(“NIJ seeks proposals for research and technology development leading to the
introduction into practice of forensic tools that can overcome the challenges of
the Cloud computing environment.”); Joe McKendrick, Cloud Forensics: New Practice
Emerges Out of Necessity, SMARTPLANET (Jan. 31., 2011, 9:39 AM),
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/cloud-forensics-new-practiceemerges-out-of-necessity/13338.
12. BILL NELSON ET AL., GUIDE TO COMPUTER FORENSICS AND INVESTIGATIONS
508 (4th ed. 2010).
13. Jerry Wegman, Computer Forensics: Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Cases,
8 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 1, 2 (2005) (explaining the evolution of digital
forensic experts and the legal challenges they face).
14. Gilbert Whittemore, Report to the House of Delegates, 2008 AM. BAR ASS’N
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confronting investigators, for which they are ill prepared.
This Comment is divided into four parts: the first section,
following this introduction, is an overview of ethical rules and
obligations governing attorneys and investigators in digital
forensics investigations. This includes some possible ethical pitfalls
in supervising investigators, and the investigator’s obligations
relating to the work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, and
information security.
The second section urges that,
notwithstanding the challenges and dangers discussed in the first
section, the use of digital forensics examiners may be essential to
prevailing in a case, or mitigating the harm incurred by the lawyer
and client. Finally, the third section introduces and briefly analyzes
special considerations in digital forensic investigations relating to
cloud computing and social media.
The American Academy of Forensic Sciences classifies digital
forensics as a forensic science. For the purposes of this Comment,
digital forensics is defined as:
The use of scientifically derived and proven methods
toward
the
preservation,
collection,
validation,
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and
presentation of digital evidence derived from digital
sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping
to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive
16
to planned operations.
SEC. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/aba_report_and_resolutio
n.pdf (“Numerous professional certifications are available to computer forensic
and network testing professionals that are based on rigorous curricula and
competency examinations.”).
15. Wegman, supra note 13, at 2.
16. Gary Palmer, A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research, DFRWS 16 (Nov. 6,
2001), http://www.dfrws.org/2001/dfrws-rm-final.pdf; see also THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (3d ed.
2010), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content
/miscFiles/glossary2010.pdf. For forensics:
The scientific examination and analysis of data held on, or retrieved from, ESI in
such a way that the information can be used as evidence in a court of law. It may
include the secure collection of computer data; the examination of suspect data to
determine details such as origin and content; the presentation of computer based
information to courts of law; and the application of a country’s laws to computer
practice. Forensics may involve recreating “deleted” or missing files from hard
drives, validating dates and logged in authors/editors of documents, and certifying
key elements of documents and/or hardware for legal purposes.
Id. at 23.
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The word “forensic” means “[u]sed in or suitable to courts of
17
law.” So, it might seem natural that digital forensics practitioners
and lawyers have occasion to work closely together. Yet, although
18
digital forensics “is by no means a new field of endeavor,” it is “a
relatively new discipline to the courts and many of the existing laws
used to prosecute computer-related crimes, legal precedents, and
19
practices related to computer forensics are in a state of flux.”
To appreciate the benefits of pairing an astute lawyer with a
digital forensics examiner who has a robust legal background,
consider that benign ingredients exist within ordinary kitchen
cupboards and pantries, which, when mixed together with care,
create appetizing confections or healing concoctions.
To
appreciate the risks of an alternative arrangement, recall that
baking soda mixed with vinegar results in a frothy mess.
Accordingly, the prudent attorney must select a digital forensics
expert carefully, and maintain strict adherence to both separation
of duties and supervisory capacity.
II. ETHICS IN DIGITAL FORENSICS INVESTIGATIONS
A. Ethical Rules Governing Digital Forensics Investigations
In the United States, there are no digital forensics licensing
20
bodies, although a few states require digital forensics examiners to
21
The American Bar
be licensed as private investigators.
Association posits that “[i]nvestigation and expert testimony in
computer forensics and network testing should be based upon the
current state of science and technology, best practices in the
22
industry, and knowledge, skills, and education of the expert.”
And, although most private digital forensics organizations do
23
impose a code of ethics as a condition of membership, there is
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (9th ed. 2009).
18. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 508.
19. Computer Forensics, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM 3 (2008),
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/forensics.pdf.
20. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 576.
21. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.821–338.823 (2011); TEX. OCC. CODE §§
1702.101, 1702.388, 1702.386 (2010); Stephen K. Lubega, Is Your Computer Forensics
Expert Required to Have a PI License? MYRIAD LITIGATION SOLUTIONS (Apr. 2009),
http://www.myriadlit.com/newsbyte_v3full.html; John Tredennick, Collecting
Computer Data in the U.S.: Pick the Wrong State and You Could Wind Up in Jail, L. TECH.
TODAY, July 2008, at 1–2.
22. Whittemore, supra note 14, at 2.
23. See, e.g., Code of Ethics, EC-COUNCIL, https://www.eccouncil.org
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little known about frequency of enforcement, efficacy of
enforcement, or ethics awareness among the membership. As one
court explained:
One survey of civil trials estimated that experts
appear in 86% of the cases with an average of 3.8 experts
per trial. While expert witnesses are appearing in civil
cases in increasing numbers, the topic of expert witness
ethics and professionalism is largely undeveloped and
there are few definitive statements about what exactly the
expert witness’s ethical obligations are and how they are
to handle the subtle as well as the more blatant attempts
to influence them. . . . Even where professional
associations have established ethical guidelines for
conducting investigations, forming opinions and writing
reports, very few explain how the ethical boundaries
imposed on judges and lawyers may bear on the
performance of their role in the legal system regardless of
whether they are employed as a retained forensic expert
24
for one of the parties or as a court-appointed expert.
In contrast, the legal profession is regulated by states’ supreme
25
courts, most of which have adopted the ABA model rules. And,
although there has long been criticism of the self-regulation
26
model, lawyers are generally cognizant of attorney regulation, are
/about_us/code_of_ethics.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Code of Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, INT’L SOC’Y OF FORENSIC COMPUTER EXAMINERS,
http://www.isfce.com/ethics2.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Code of Ethics and
Conduct, CYBERSECURITY INST., http://www.cybersecurityinstitute.biz/training
/ethicsconduct.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); Rob Lee, Certification: Ethics, SANS
COMPUTER FORENSICS, http://computer-forensics11.sans.org
/certification/ethics (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); HTCIA Bylaws, HIGH TECH. CRIME
2
INVESTIGATION ASS’N (2010), http://www.htcia.org/bylaws.shtml; (ICS) Code of
2
Ethics, (ICS) , https://www.isc2.org/ethics/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 11,
2011); New Membership: Code of Ethics, INT’L ASS’N OF COMPUTER INVESTIGATIVE
SPECIALISTS, http://www.iacis.com/new_membership/code_of_ethics (last visited
Sept. 11, 2011).
24. Kenneth C. v. Delonda R., No. VXXXXXX/02, 2006 WL 47429, at *8
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006).
25. “The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1983. They serve as models for the ethics rules of most
states.” ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/m
odel_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
26. See, e.g., F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal
Profession: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193 (1974); AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 3 (1970), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/8

6

Harrington: Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag-Team

2011] COLLABORATING WITH DIGITAL FORENSICS EXPERT

359

required to take ethics continuing education annually, and most
were required to pass a course on professional responsibility in law
27
school.
B. The Lawyer’s Ethical Obligations While Working with Digital Forensics
Examiners
Whereas the digital forensics profession is not subject to
formal ethics standards, the Rules of Professional Conduct may
nonetheless be implicated by the use of a digital forensics
28
Practitioners should be especially mindful of Model
examiner.
Rule 5.3, which imposes ethical responsibilities upon lawyers who
supervise nonlawyers:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by
or associated with a lawyer:
....
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such
a person that would be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable
/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_Report.authcheckdam.pdf; 2009 ABA
Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/survey_lawyer_discipline_syste
ms_2009.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2011); How Accountable Is the Civil Justice
System?, HALT, http://www.halt.org/about_halt/press_room/pdf/Full_Media
_Kit.pdf#Advocacy_by_the_Numbers (last visited Sept. 11, 2011).
27. See 2010–2011 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS,
INTERPRETATION 302-2 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2011_2012_a
ba_standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf (“The substantial instruction in the
history, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its
members required by Standard 302(a)(5) includes instruction in matters such as
the law of lawyering and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American
Bar Association.”); Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, NAT’L CONF. OF
BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited Sept.
11, 2011) (“The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) . . . is
required for admission to the bars of all but four U.S. jurisdictions.”).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1–.2 (2010) (governing the ethical
responsibilities of both supervisory lawyers and subordinate lawyers).
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managerial authority in the law firm in which the person
is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the
person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
29
reasonable remedial action.
Although it is improbable that a court would construe Rule 5.3
to require attorneys to possess the same level of knowledge and skill
as the digital forensics expert, the rule does impose a significant,
perhaps underestimated, responsibility. One court recently ruled
that lawyers have an affirmative duty to be actively engaged in the
electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) collection process such that the
lawyer should meet with the client to physically review the client’s
data repositories wherever they may be located (including, if
30
necessary, personal computers). This is not a requirement that
31
lawyers be digital forensics experts, but rather that lawyers should
“be active participants in setting [e-discovery] search criteria,
screening for privileged information, and handling non-technical
32
If too much autonomy is reposed in experts (or
details.”
technology), a lawyer can lose control of the case, leading to
33
increased risk exposure and increased costs.
The problem of costs is highlighted by a few recent cases
concerning fee-related disputes of astonishing amounts that arose
from seeming miscommunication between the law firm and the
34
digital forensics firm. Although such costs may be recoverable in
29. Id. R. 5.3.
30. Transcript of Telephone Conference on Discovery Dispute at 12, Roffe v.
Eagle Rock Energy, L.P., No. 5258-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.iediscovery.com/files/Roffe_v_%20Eagle_Rock.pdf.
31. See, e.g., SonoMedica, Inc. v. Mohler, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65714, at *17–
18 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2009) (“Forensic examinations are not a routine part of
discovery.”).
32. Larue, et al., supra note 3, at 13 (citing Jason Krause, Discovery Channels,
A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 52); see also Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg Materials Corp. of
Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 220 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that although an IT consultant
and software programs are crucial to adhering to FED. R. EVID. 502, it is not
enough to rely upon technology; it is the lawyer’s responsibility to check for
privileged documents).
33. Larue et al. supra, note 3, at 13.
34. United States v. Afremov, 611 F.3d 970, 973–74 (8th Cir. 2010) (involving
a dispute over invoices of a Minnesota computer forensics firm in the amounts of
$628,737 and $178,850); Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 04-40346, 2008 WL
474127 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008) (involving a disputed invoice of a Minnesota
computer forensics firm in the amount of $94,903); Debra Cassens Weiss, Computer
Expert Sues Leonard Street Law Firm for $775K, A.B.A. J. (May 21, 2009, 11:11 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/computer_expert_sues_leonard_street_
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35

some cases against the non-prevailing party, the proactive
approach to cost containment is for the managing lawyer to define
and limit the scope of the investigation. This is because digital
36
forensics analysis “takes as much time as the analyst has to give it.”
If the case is unusually important or the nature of the evidence
37
sought is “not reasonably accessible,” an examiner could spend
38
several weeks or even months analyzing a single piece of media.
“If the case is less important or the nature of the case permits the
[proponent] . . . to make its case more easily, the investigator may
39
spend only a few hours.” This cost-benefit analysis has come to be
40
known as the “proportionality” doctrine.
Cost seems to be the anxiety most often cited concerning
41
Indeed, “The use of experts is
digital forensics examinations.
law_firm_for_775k/ (involving an invoicing dispute of a Minnesota computer
forensics firm in the approximate amount of $775,000).
35. See, e.g., AssociationVoice, Inc. v. AtHomeNet, Inc., No. 10-cv-00109-CMAMEH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1654, at *14 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2011) (stating that
computer forensic investigation costs satisfy the “loss” requirement of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(g) and (c)(4)(A)(i));
Sonomedica, Inc. v. Mohler, No. 1:08-cv-230, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65714, at *19
(E.D. Va. July 28, 2009) (assessing $108,212.15 of monetary sanctions, inclusive of
digital forensics firm’s fees against contemnors).
36. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
544 (2005).
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) defines sources that are “reasonably
accessible” as being so because of “undue burden or cost.”
38. Kerr, supra, note 36, at 544.
39. Id. But see Craig Ball, The End of Digital Forensics?, FORENSIC FOCUS:
ARTICLES/PAPERS (July 23, 2011) (alteration in original), http://articles
.forensicfocus.com/2011/07/23/the-end-of-digital-forensics/ (discussing the size
of modern hard-drives where the imaging alone of “multi-terabyte” media is
“measured in days, not hours”).
40. See ONT. E-DISCOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 10 GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO
MINIMIZE E-DISCOVERY COSTS A.1 (2010), available at http://www.oba.org/En
/publicaffairs_en/ediscovery_docs/10Guidingprinciplestominimizeediscoverycosts-v.2.1.DOC. The principles show that under the proportionality
principle, determinant factors include relevance, the cost of production,
importance of the records, importance of the case, and the amount in controversy.
Thus, in a “case with a smaller dollar value, a party’s e-discovery obligations should
be less onerous than in a case with a larger dollar value, or in a case where the
interests at stake are of greater importance.” Id. See also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C), which requires the court to limit “the frequency or extent of
discovery” where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Id.
41. See, e.g., Tyler Moore, The Economics of Digital Forensics, FIFTH WORKSHOP ON
THE ECON. OF INFO. SEC., 1 (June 26–28, 2006), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk
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42

costly.” But another salient consideration is the possibility that
the conduct of the digital forensics examiner could be imputed to
the attorney in certain situations under Model Rule 5.3. Perhaps
the most common of such conduct is negligence, but the list could
also include deception because of its popularity and efficacy as an
43
Deceptive techniques are, however,
investigative technique.
proscribed in the practice of law by the Rules of Professional
44
Conduct. As an example, one state supreme court found that a
prosecutor who impersonated a public defender in an attempt to
induce the surrender of a murder suspect had committed an act of
45
deception that violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. And
many states, including Minnesota, have held that “[t]here are
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent
46
of an affirmative misrepresentation.”
The question of whether deception, as used in Model Rule 8.4,
exists in the context of a digital forensics, cloud forensics, or
network forensics (intrusion detection) investigation is not well
47
settled. In one Minnesota attorney disciplinary proceeding, the
/users/twm29/weis06-moore.pdf (“It turns out that many of the important
constraints on digital forensic practices are not technical, but economic.”).
42. Paul Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a PostDaubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2004); see also Weiss,
supra note 34.
43. See, e.g., Allan Lengel, Your New Facebook Friend May Be a Federal Agent,
AOLNEWS (Mar 26, 2010 11:44 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/03/26/yournew-facebook-friend-may-be-a-federal-agent/; see also Craig Ball, Cross-examination of
D.
BALL
P.C.
(2004),
the
Computer
Forensics
Expert,
CRAIG
http://www.craigball.com/expertcross.pdf (“The world of computer forensics is
heavily populated by former law enforcement officers from the Secret Service, FBI,
Treasury, military investigative offices and local police forces.”). The Supreme
Court has tacitly approved deception as a valid law enforcement technique in
investigations and interrogations. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)
(“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception . . . .”); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) (“Criminal activity is such that stealth and
strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.”).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2009).
45. In re Paulter, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002). Paulter quotes the Oath of
Admission-Colorado State Bar (2002): “I will employ such means as are consistent
with Truth and Honor; I will treat all persons whom I encounter through my
practice of law with fairness, courtesy, respect, and honesty.” Id.
46. In re Zotaley, 546 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1996) (quoting MINN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2009)).
47. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Muddy Waters: Spyware’s Legal and
Ethical Implications, GPSOLO MAG., Jan/Feb 2006, available at http://www
.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_ma
gazine_index/spywarelegalethicalimplications.html (“The legality of spyware is
murky, at best. The courts have spoken of it only infrequently, so there is precious

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/8

10

Harrington: Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag-Team

2011] COLLABORATING WITH DIGITAL FORENSICS EXPERT

363

supreme court accepted an attorney’s conditional admission of
misconduct for violating Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4 after pleading guilty to misdemeanor unauthorized
computer access by installing and using an e-mail spyware
48
program. Yet, even if a digital forensics investigator refrains from
using technology that is unlawful or contains malicious executable
code, he or she foreseeably could use technology that arguably
constitutes “deception.” For example, an investigator may employ
a “Web bug,” a surreptitious file object commonly used by
spammers that is placed in an e-mail message or e-mail attachment
(such as a PDF or Microsoft Word document) to monitor user
49
behavior. When the user opens the e-mail or attachment, and if
the user did not preconfigure the e-mail client or program to
refrain from retrieving images or HTML content from the Internet,
the e-mail client or program will attempt to retrieve the file object
from a Web server and, in the process, transmit an HTTP request
50
that includes the user’s IP address and other information. This
information becomes available to the sender either through an
automated report service (e.g., ReadNotify.com) or simply by
monitoring traffic to the Web server.
In a recent project
demonstrating a seemingly appropriate use, researchers employed
such technology in decoy documents to track possible misuse of
51
confidential documents.
Adopting the view that the foregoing constitutes deception,
one might also view as deceptive the creation of a decoy Web site
for the purpose of attracting one or more visitors (perhaps as a
URL-link contained in an invitation sent via e-mail) and reviewing
Web traffic logs to collect identifying information and visitor
browsing patterns and activity (such as in following certain decoy
links or documents), assuming the visitors were unaware of the

little guidance.”).
48. In re Trudeau, 705 N.W.2d 409, 409–10 (Minn. 2005).
49. Richard M. Smith, Microsoft Word Documents That “Phone Home” THE
PRIVACY FOUNDATION (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://web.archive.org/web
/20001009091304/http://www.privacyfoundation.org/advisories/advWordBugs.h
tml (“A ‘Web bug’ could allow an author to track where a document is being read
and how often. In addition, the author can watch how a ‘bugged’ document is
passed from one person to another or from one organization to another.”).
50. Id.
51. Brian M. Bowen et al., Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents,
COLUM. UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI., 1 (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.cs.columbia
.edu/~angelos/Papers/2009/DecoyDocumentsSECCOM09.pdf.
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52

site’s true purpose.
A few state bar associations have already begun to address
these technology-related ethical pitfalls. The Philadelphia Bar
Association Professional Guidance Committee advised in Opinion
2009-02 that an attorney who asks an agent (such as an
investigator) to “friend” a party on Facebook in order to obtain
access to that party’s non-public information, would violate, among
others, Rule 5.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
53
Conduct. Likewise, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics issued Formal
Opinion 2010-2, which provides that a lawyer violates, among
others, New York Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.3, if an
attorney employs an agent to engage in the deception of
“friending” a party under false pretenses to obtain evidence from a
54
social networking website.
And, although Rule 5.3 appears to require scienter (viz.
55
“knowledge of the specific conduct”), an emerging body of ethics
opinions concerning information technology appear to be at odds
with such a requirement. California’s proposed Formal Opinion
08-0002 requires a lawyer to evaluate information security and finds
that “attorneys are faced with an ongoing responsibility of
52. Nelson & Simek, supra note 47. The authors characterize spyware as
“deceptive, at best,” and warn attorneys about running afoul of Rule 1.2 in that “a
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” and Rule 8.4 in that:
[I]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a
criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law; or (c) engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 8.4 (2009)).
53. Philadelphia Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-2 (2009),
available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly
.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
54. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www2.nycbar.org
/Publications/reports/show_html.php?rid=1134.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1), (2) (2009) (explaining
that a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if the lawyer orders or,
with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or the if
lawyer has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action).
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evaluating the level of security of technology that has increasingly
56
become an indispensable tool in the practice of law.” Alabama’s
Ethics Committee Opinion 2010-02 requires attorneys to exercise
reasonable care against unauthorized access, which includes
becoming knowledgeable about a cloud provider’s storage and
57
security. Arizona’s Ethics Opinion 09-04 provides, in pertinent
part, that
[W]hether a particular system provides reasonable
protective measures must be informed by the technology
reasonably available at the time to secure data against
unintentional disclosure. As technology advances occur,
lawyers should periodically review security measures in
place to ensure that they still reasonably protect the
security and confidentiality of the clients’ documents and
58
information.
It is also important that lawyers recognize their own
competence limitations regarding computer security
measures and take the necessary time and energy to
become competent or alternatively consult available
59
experts in the field.
Likewise, Opinion 842 of the New York State Bar Association
60
requires lawyers to “stay abreast of technological advances,” and
Minnesota’s Rule 1.6 requires that
A lawyer must act competently to safeguard
information relating to the representation of a client
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the
representation of the client or who are subject to the
61
lawyer’s supervision.
56. State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility &
Conduct, Formal Op. Interim No. 08-0002 (2010), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=odIjrEe0wjI%3d&tabid=2167.
57. Alabama State Bar, Ethics Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www
.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneId=425.
58. State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009), available at http://www
.myazbar.org/ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=704 (citations and quotations omitted).
59. Id.
60. New York State Bar, Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 842 (2010),
available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm
?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=42697&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm (quoting New York State Bar, Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782
(2004)).
61. MINN. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2005) (emphasis added);
see also Minnesota Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Op. No. 22 (2010), available at
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Another concern regarding lawyer supervision is whether
lawful data-mining performed by investigators at the behest of
attorneys outside of the formal discovery process could lead to
invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, or other tort
62
liability. A few prominent cases suggest that individuals maintain
a privacy right in data that can be reconstructed through
63
64
aggregation and inference. In United States v. Maynard, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, faced with the question of
whether evidence obtained by police through the warrantless
search of a GPS device was admissible, concluded that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of
his movements, even though he had no expectation of privacy in
65
his individual movements exposed to the public.
Whereas the sum of one’s movements being entitled to an
expectation of privacy may seem novel, it is well settled as to the
66
sanctity of the home. And yet, new technologies will continue to
test the limits of that expectation, such as a new geo-location
technique announced by researchers from the University of
Electronic Science and Technology in China and Northwestern
University: they claim the ability to locate a target computer on the
67
Internet to within 2,250 to 328 feet, a few blocks.
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/LPRBOpinions/Opinion%2022.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Marshall Tanick, The Privacy Paradox, 65 BENCH & BAR MINN. 8
(Sept., 2008) (discussing privacy and investigative issues, and collecting cases).
63. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487,
500 (1994) (“An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of
information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that
information may be available to the public in some form.”); United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
64. 615 F.3d at 558 (“[The] whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal
more—than does the sum of its parts.”).
65. Id.
66. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 884 (1987) (noting that under the
Fourth Amendment, it is axiomatic that people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their own homes).
67. The researchers used Google Maps to physically locate over 76,000 known
web servers, and measured the time it takes to send a data packet to a target. They
then converted the time to a distance measurement. Where the target and any of
the 76,000 web servers shared a common “hop” (a router connection) in the
transmission, the researchers compared the time difference between the mapped
Web servers and the common hop, and between the target and common hop.
After performing multiple repetitive traces, the researchers claimed to locate the
target computer to within 2,250 to 328 feet, thereby narrowing the location to
within a few streets. Their findings were disclosed on April 1, 2011 at the 8th
Usenix Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation in Boston.
Yong Wong et al., Towards Street-Level Client-Independent IP Geolocation, USENIX.ORG
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In situations where technological tools or processes not readily
available to the public are used to reveal the physical location of an
internet user, it’s not difficult to imagine that a court might look to
Kyllo v. United States for the proposition that an individual’s
68
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. But, if Boring
69
v. Google is any indication of a trend, tort plaintiffs must establish
they’ve suffered some greater injury than having their approximate
physical locations discovered through IP address routing. In
Boring, plaintiff property owners filed suit against the internet
search provider giant alleging, inter alia, invasion of privacy and
trespass because Google publicly provided digital photographs of
plaintiffs’ home and property without their authorization. The
court found that plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing the
intrusion was substantial, highly offensive, or transgressed decency
70
standards.
C. The Digital Forensics Examiner’s Obligations in a Litigation Support
Role
As noted above, significant legal and ethical challenges
confront digital forensics investigators, for which they are ill
prepared. Accordingly, the focus of this Comment is not on the
particular technical qualifications of the expert or methodologies
necessary to establish admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and Daubert and Kumho Tire (or state
71
Indeed, digital forensics is a discipline that is
equivalents).
inherently inhospitable to pretenders, because it is based upon the
existence or non-existence of binary data, which ordinarily is
discernable through proven, industry-standard, repeatable means.
And: “Where a proffered expert knows himself or herself to be a
(Mar. 06, 2011), http://www.usenix.org/events/nsdi11/tech/full_papers
/Wang_Yong.pdf.
68. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
‘search’ . . . .”).
69. 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 362 F.
App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
70. Id. at 700.
71. FED. R. EVID. 702; Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999) (extending the Daubert standard to all expert testimony); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that a trial judge is
the “gatekeeper” of scientific testimony and may admit scientific testimony that is
not generally accepted so long as the testimony is relevant and reliable).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8

368

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

quack or otherwise to be offering false testimony, the situation is
like that of any other witness who is perpetrating a fraud on the
72
court. Such acts are illegal as well as unethical.”
It is the legal and ethical issues that warrant further discussion.
Just as a lawyer may be confounded by technology in dealing with
digital forensics matters, many (perhaps most) digital forensics
experts lack formal legal training, and are uninformed about their
special obligations in the employ of a lawyer. These obligations
include zealously guarding the attorney-client privilege, applying
the work product doctrine, developing reports, exhibits, and
testimony (that are both admissible and understandable to a lay
jury or judge), and conducting their work in a way that does not
compromise the integrity of the case or the rights, privileges, or
immunities of the retaining party.
In certain situations, such as where digital forensics examiners
73
74
serve as special masters or third-party neutrals, they are regarded
75
as officers of the court, entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The
76
use of a third-party neutral has significant advantages. First, as an
72. Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 425 (2001).
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (authorizing the court to appoint one who performs
certain duties consented to by the parties, and hold trial proceedings and make or
recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury, if the
appointment is warranted by (1) some exceptional condition; (2) the need to
perform accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damage; or (3) the need
to address pre-trial and post-trial matters that cannot be effectively and timely
addressed by an available Article III judge or magistrate judge).
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2009).
A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator,
conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or
unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a
transaction.
Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a
facilitator, evaluator or decisionmaker depends on the particular process
that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154,
1159 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[Investigators reporting to the court are] officers of the
court [because they are] performing a judicial function at the direction of [the]
court.”); Ogden v. Ogden, 39 P.3d 513, 516 (Alaska 2001) (“[C]ourt-appointed
custody investigators are officers of the court and perform quasi-judicial functions
. . . .”); Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 655 (Colo. 2004) (defining
“investigators” as officers of the court); Kahre v. Kahre, 916 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Okla.
1995) (stating that investigators are officers of the court); see also Douglas R.
Richmond, The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 693,
706‒09 (1993).
76. See,
e.g.,
Craig
Ball,
Neutral
Examiners,
FORENSIC FOCUS,
http://www.forensicfocus.com/index.php?name=Content&pid=346 (last visited
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officer of the court, the expert is subject to the court’s inherent
powers, thereby providing an extra measure of accountability for
77
misconduct (e.g., confidentiality breaches). Second, a third-party
neutral is ostensibly impartial, and this impartiality presumptively
aids in the fact-finding process and administration of justice.
Third, the third-party neutral is aptly situated to resolve discovery
disputes, including issues of confidentiality, relevance, and
privilege, and, if necessary, obtain court intervention or in camera
review to resolve such disputes.
If the examiner is not appointed by the court, but rather is
retained by a party to an adversarial proceeding, he or she is
78
Thus, in Ferron v.
nevertheless obliged to ferret out the truth.
79
Search Cactus, LLC, a U.S. district court deemed both the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s computer experts as officers of the
court in order to protect the confidentiality of certain ESI found on
the plaintiff’s computer that was unrelated to the suit.
1.

Work Product Doctrine

The work product doctrine enhances a lawyer’s ability to
render competent counsel, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in
Sept. 11, 2011).
77. See Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 738 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an expert witness is subject to court’s remedial contempt authority); United
States v. Paccione, 964 F.2d 1269, 1274–75 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A court may bind nonparties to the terms of an injunction or restraining order to preserve its ability to
render a judgment in a case over which it has jurisdiction.”).
78. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 523 (“Your only agenda should be finding
the truth, so don’t think in terms of catching somebody or proving something. It’s
not your job to win the case. Don’t become an advocate . . . .”); Sharon D. Nelson
& John W. Simek, Electronic Evidence: The Ten Commandments, SENSEI ENTERPRISES,
INC. (2003), http://www.senseient.com/articles/pdf/article18.pdf (“[G]ood
experts are seekers of truth and will report their findings regardless of what those
findings may be.”). Contra Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 882 (Colo. 1987)
(“As a practical matter, too, an expert hired by defense counsel is likely to feel a
degree of loyalty to the defendant’s cause. We need not ascribe this fact to base
motives on the part of the experts; indeed, the nature of the adversary process, the
confidentiality surrounding legal representation and professional norms and
ethics of particular experts all may foster this attitude of loyalty to the
defendant.”); Christa L. Klopfenstein, Discoverability of Opinion Work Product
Materials Provided to Testifying Experts, 32 IND. L. REV. 481, 503 (1999) (“Unlike
other types of trial witnesses, experts are part of a party’s litigation team who, like
the attorney, are employed expressly for the purpose of analyzing the strengths
and weaknesses of a party’s case. . . . Experts are not impartial witnesses. Like
attorneys, they are paid to advocate a point of view.”).
79. No. 2:06-CV-327, 2008 WL 1902499, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008).
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Hickman v. Taylor:
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing
parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client’s
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
80
undue and needless interference.
It is therefore imperative that both attorneys and examiners
understand the doctrine and how it applies to digital forensics
examinations. Enjoying the privilege of work product immunity is
one of several reasons the expert should be directly retained by the
81
attorney, rather than the attorney’s client.
Some practitioners conflate the work product doctrine with
the attorney-client privilege (discussed below). Although the work
product doctrine is broader than the attorney-client privilege, it is
not a privilege, but rather a limited immunity from production,
82
The doctrine
which can be overcome in certain situations.
83
applies in both civil and criminal cases, and protects not only
documents and tangible things prepared by attorneys, but also
those prepared by an attorney’s “consultant, surety, indemnitor,
84
insurer, or agent.” In the context of such examinations, the work
product doctrine also covers the “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
85
A prudent expert
representative concerning the litigation.”
80. 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947).
81. Other reasons the attorney should maintain the role of “quarterback,”
and that the expert should have very limited interaction with the client, include:
preventing an attorney-client relationship from forming between the expert and
client (if the expert also is an attorney, and the expert is likely to testify); avoiding
fee disputes from arising between the client and expert; and maintaining the
scope and strategy of the case. See infra note 111 and accompanying text; supra
notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
82. Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 at 510–15 (holding that courts may order
production of some materials protected by the work product doctrine under
certain circumstances); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (“[The] materials may
be discovered if . . . they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and . . .
the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and
cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other
means.”).
83. United States v. Nobles, 42 U.S. 225, 236 (1975).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); see also In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[The work product doctrine provides]
a zone of privacy within which to prepare the client’s case and plan strategy,
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should, therefore, take affirmative steps to keep confidential the
software and hardware used during the examination, as well as his
or her theories, algorithms, cryptology, notes, tools, processes,
methods, search queries, resource materials, mental impressions,
and techniques. And, because the doctrine may be overcome in
limited circumstances, attorneys should give careful consideration
to whether they instruct their experts to memorialize preliminary
findings in writing, or whether to destroy (or refrain from
86
retaining) draft reports.
In 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was amended to
give experts’ draft reports the protection of the work product
doctrine, exempting them from mandatory disclosure. The rule
expressly provides that the doctrine applies to “protect drafts of any
report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of
87
the form in which the draft is recorded.” The amended rule also
applies work product protection to communications between
88
experts and the counsel who retain them, with three exceptions:
(1) communications pertaining to the expert’s compensation; (2)
facts or data that the attorney provided and the expert considered
in forming opinions; and (3) assumptions that the attorney
89
Critics contend the
provided and that the expert relied on.
amendment affords attorneys too much latitude in drafting
without undue interference.”); United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739 (D. N.H.
1992), aff’d as to issue of work product doctrine, rev’d on other grounds, 29 F.3d 754 (1st
Cir. 1994); Stanley D. Davis & Thomas D. Beisecker, Discovering Trial Consultant
Work Product: A New Way to Borrow an Adversary’s Wits?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 581,
619 (1994) (“[T]he attorney’s discussions of case theory and the consultant’s
suggestions thereon should qualify for the higher protection accorded mental
impressions.”).
86. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 348–49 (“[The forensic tool] also
produces a case log file, where you can maintain a detailed record of all activities
during your examination, such as keyword searches and data extractions. . . . At
times, however, you might not want the log feature turned on. If you’re following
a hunch, for example, but aren’t sure the evidence you recover is applicable to the
investigation, you might not want opposing counsel to see a record of this
information because he or she could use it to question your methods and perhaps
discredit your testimony. . . . Look through the evidence first before enabling the
log feature to record searches. This approach isn’t meant to conceal evidence; it’s
a precaution to ensure that your testimony can be used in court.”). But see Univ. of
Pittsburgh v. Townsend, No. 3:04-CV-291, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24620 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that it was improper for the counsel to have
instructed or otherwise suggested to the experts that all e-mails be destroyed, as
they became the subject of multiple discovery requests).
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
89. Id.
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90

experts’ reports or influencing their opinions.
The counter
argument is that “[t]he risk of an attorney influencing an expert
witness does not go unchecked in the adversarial system, for the
reasonableness of an expert opinion can be judged against the
knowledge of the expert’s field and is always subject to the scrutiny
91
of other experts.”
One area of particular concern relating to the work product
doctrine and digital forensics investigations is the applicability of
the Adam Walsh Act and similar state statutes. Under 18 U.S.C. §
3509(m), added by § 504 of Title V of the Adam Walsh Act, “any
property or material that constitutes child pornography . . . shall
remain in the care, custody, and control of either the Government
92
or the court.” Title V of the Act contains congressional findings
that: “[e]very instance of viewing images of child pornography
represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a
repetition of their abuse”; that “[c]hild pornography constitutes
prima facie contraband, and as such should not be distributed to,
or copied by, child pornography defendants or their attorneys”;
and that “[i]t is imperative to prohibit the reproduction of child
pornography in criminal cases so as to avoid repeated violation and
abuse of victims, so long as the government makes reasonable
accommodations for the inspection, viewing, and examination of
93
such material for the purposes of mounting a criminal defense.”
“Ample opportunity” and “reasonable access” under the Act
requires: (1) “the government [to] . . . supply reasonably up-to-date
tools (hardware and software) and facilities [in order to] . . .
construct a reasonable, available forensic defense,” (2) “[the ability
of] a defense expert to utilize his or her hardware or software,” and
(3) “that the analysis be performed in a situation where attorneyclient privilege and work product will not be easily, accidentally
exposed to the government, and in a facility which is open to the
defense at its request during normal working hours, and to the
94
95
extent feasible, during non-working hours.” In State v. Boyd, the
90. Robert Ambrogi, Changes to Rule 26 Bring Praise — Albeit Faint, BULLSEYE
LEGAL BLOG (June 1, 2011), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/blog/2011
/changes-to-rule-26-brings-praise-albeit-faint.
91. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289, 295–96 (W.D. Mich.
1995).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1) (2006).
93. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109248, §§ 501(2)(D)–(F), 120 Stat. 587, 624 (2006).
94. United States v. Flinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
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Supreme Court of Washington held that preparation for trial
would “likely require revisiting the evidence many times before and
during trial” and, therefore, where the evidence consists of a
computer hard drive, “adequate representation requires providing
a ‘mirror image’ of that hard drive; enabling the defense attorney
to consult with computer experts who can tell how the evidence
made its way onto the computer,” and that anything less could
place an undue burden on defense counsel or a defense expert,
96
interfering with a defendant’s constitutional rights.
In this examiner’s experience, most government agencies
endeavor to provide reasonable access, but others, perhaps wellmeaning, have sought to dictate what equipment the defense
expert may use (including the number of computers, and a
restriction of both optical read/write drives and solid state drives),
or have proposed the examiner work in a small room alongside
97
state staff, or have required the examiner to use state equipment
98
to conduct Internet research during the examination, or have
proposed limiting the examiner to a black-and-white printout of
the forensic report or to an electronic copy on a read/write optical
device supplied by the state, and have insisted that the work
product be inspected by a state employee prior to removal from the
99
The foregoing limitations not only violate the work
facility.
product doctrine, but also implicate a defendant’s right to effective

95. 158 P.3d 54, 57–62 (Wash. 2007).
96. Id. at 60–61.
97. See United States v. Winslow, No. 3:07-CR-00072-TMB-DMS, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66855, at *6 (D. Alaska Jan. 28, 2008). The Winslow court examined
the lack of privacy caused by placing a government agent inside the room with
defense experts, such that the experts were not able to have the requisite
confidentiality needed to talk about the results with other experts and to talk with
defense counsel about their findings, and also because the agents inside the room
may be distracting. “These restrictions impermissibly intrude upon both the
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and are insufficient to ‘assure the
thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case’ allowing for a
‘fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975)).
98. See State v. Johnson, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0300, 2010 WL 1424369, at *5 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2010) (“[Defendant] argues that the expert could not access her
reference materials if required to conduct the exam at the FBI office. . . . [The]
argument is persuasive. The State did not proffer a remedy to the expert’s
inability to access her reference materials at the FBI facility.”).
99. See United States v. Bortnick, No. 08-20151-CM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23407, at *9 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2010) (holding that electronic search imposes an
unreasonable restriction on the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense).
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100

counsel and due process,
and are likely to result in
relinquishment of the media containing the contraband to the
101
defense expert under the Act’s so-called “safety valve.”
2.

Attorney-Client Privilege and Confidentiality

The attorney-client privilege is one of the most hallowed tenets
102
of American common law. The primary function of the privilege
“is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
103
the observance of law and administration of justice.” Without the
privilege, which withholds otherwise relevant evidence, “the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult
104
In general,
to obtain fully informed legal advice.”
communications are protected under the attorney-client privilege if
(1) a person is seeking legal advice from a lawyer acting in his legal
capacity, (2) the communication is made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice, (3) the communication is made in
105
confidence, and (4) the communication is made by the client.
So, how might this apply to digital forensics examinations?
[A]s both a legal and practical matter, the defense
expert’s relationship with the defendant and counsel has
been protected from intrusions by the state. The law has
recognized several doctrines that afford a degree of
confidentiality to the expert-defense relationship. Thus,
statements made to the expert by the defendant and
counsel may be protected by the attorney-client
106
privilege.
Compare the foregoing pronouncement from one state court with
100. Sharon Nelson et al., In Defense of the Defense: The Use of Computer Forensics
ENTERPRISES,
INC.
(2009),
in
Child
Pornography
Cases,
SENSEI
http://www.senseient.com/articles/pdf/In_Defense_of_the_Defense.pdf.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(B) (2006); see, e.g., State v. Allen, No. E200701018-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 114, at *17–19 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 12, 2009) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3509); United States v. Knellinger, 471
F. Supp. 2d 640, 650 (E.D. Va. 2007) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3509 as well).
102. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
103. Id.
104. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
105. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982)
(quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
106. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo. 1987).
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that from another: “Attorney-client privilege is perhaps a
misnomer, since only the client’s statements enjoy a privilege.
Communications of the attorney, on the other hand, are not
privileged, except to the narrow extent to which they reveal
107
Courts may, indeed,
communications made by the client.”
construe a client’s direct communications to the digital forensics
expert as privileged, if the expert is regarded an agent of the
108
And it is true that an expert is not considered a thirdattorney.
party whose presence destroys the privilege if the expert’s presence
is deemed necessary to secure and facilitate communication
109
between the client and the attorney (not unlike an interpreter).
But it does not appear to this commentator that communications
between an attorney and an expert should be afforded attorneyclient privilege sui generis, because these are not communications
110
made in confidence to an attorney while seeking legal advice.
This view notwithstanding, both the expert and the attorney
would owe a duty to the client—the holder of the privilege—to
maintain confidentiality. The attorney’s obligation is detailed in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Rules 1.6 (governing
disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation
111
of a client during the lawyer’s representation of the client), 1.18
107. Kennedy v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 2010 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 24, at *4
(Pa. C.P. Feb. 2, 2010).
108. Fin. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 961, 967 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
109. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961); see also In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) (“However, material
transmitted to accountants may fall under the attorney-client privilege if the
accountant is acting as an agent of an attorney for the purpose of assisting with the
provision of legal advice.”); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 143 (8th Cir.
1972) (“[The] test is whether the [expert’s] services are a necessary aid to the
rendering of effective legal services to the client.”). But see United States v. Ackert,
169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding the privilege is vitiated by the presence
of third parties who do not translate information from the client to the attorney
but rather provide information independently to the attorney).
110. See Matthew P. Matiasevich, I (Might) Get By With a Little Help from my
Expert: Expert Witnesses in Trust and Estate Litigation (May 6–7, 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estat
e/symposia/2011/rpte_symposia_2011_m2903_te_expert_help_litigation.authche
ckdam.pdf. Matiasevich presented at the 21st Annual Spring Symposia of the ABA
Section of Real Property, Trust, and Estate Law. “The attorney-client privilege
rarely applies to experts for the simple reason that the expert is almost never the
client and hence communications are not confidential.” Id.
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). Other professionals,
such as accountants, are governed by similar rules. See MINN. STAT. §§ 326A.12–
A.13 (2010) (discussing confidential communications, working papers, and
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(the lawyer’s duties regarding information provided to the lawyer
112
by a prospective client), and 1.9 (the lawyer’s duty not to reveal
information relating to the lawyer’s prior representation of a
113
But the expert, who usually is not present at the
former client).
time of the communication, is also obliged to zealously protect any
information the expert discovers that implicates communications
made by the client to his or her attorney.
Further, this expert obligation may be yet another compelling
reason why an expert ideally should have legal acumen, because he
or she needs to correctly recognize and, as necessary, segregate
attorney-client privileged data.
For example, if the expert
encounters e-mails between a client and her attorney, which the
client subsequently forwarded to a friend, will the expert recognize
114
When in doubt, the expert should consider the
a privilege?
communication privileged and consult with the attorney. Note this
exhortation reveals that the integrity of the privilege itself could
depend upon the integrity of the communication channel between
the expert and the attorney.
Attorney-client privilege aside, a competent digital forensics
expert should also have background and training in information
security protocols and be able to observe strict confidentiality of all
data entrusted to him or her:
Not all cases are shrouded in secrecy, but a fair
proportion of them are. There are well known figures
getting divorced, major companies with proprietary
information at issue, public figures in the headlines and
people charged with felonies. . . . During the course of a
major case where the expert has been identified, the press
will undoubtedly come sniffing around the expert
probing for information. A good expert knows the
standard answer, ‘I’m sorry, I have no comment’ and is as
115
immoveable as the Great Wall of China.
clients’ records).
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (1983).
113. Id. R. 1.9.
114. In this example, whether the e-mail is privileged depends on whether the
jurisdiction recognizes the so-called selective-waiver doctrine. See Jonathan Feld &
Blake Mills, The Selective-Waiver Doctrine: Is It Still Alive?, 16 BUSINESS CRIMES
BULLETIN 4, 4 (Dec. 2008), http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/Publication
/30990f16-1392-4523-928a-0ffd17e4c01a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/2c7f533d-947f-427c-9773-179747282b76/Feld--Business_Crimes-Selective_Waiver.pdf (discussing the origins of the selective-waiver doctrine).
115. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Finding Wyatt Earp: Your Computer
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A recent Associated Press article, Anthony Computer Expert Backs Off
116
But,
Reported Claims, demonstrates the foregoing point well.
because the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to digital
forensics examiners, the only enforcement mechanisms are
contractual provisions (i.e., a confidentiality clause in the retainer
117
The prudent
agreement) and “loss of reputation and business.”
attorney should, therefore, include a confidentiality provision in
the engagement agreement, which may give rise to a breach of
contract action if damages are sustained. Also, if the expert is
retained while a case is active, either or both parties may move the
court for a protective order regarding the expert’s handling of
confidential data, under which the expert would be subject to the
court’s inherent supervisory powers, including sanctions and
118
contempt authority.
Finally, cautious practitioners should also consider whether a
compromise of the client’s data by the expert could be imputed to
the attorney. As discussed in an earlier section of this Comment, if
the attorney knew or had reason to know that the expert would
breach the attorney-client privilege (or otherwise compromise the
client’s confidential data), or if the attorney failed to obtain
adequate assurances that the data would be secure while in the
119
expert’s custody, the attorney may be subject to discipline.
3.

The Expert’s Report

Whether a digital forensics examiner will likely prepare a
written report depends on the nature of the case, the examiner’s
initial impressions, the attorney’s case strategy, and the jurisdiction.
If the expert plans to testify in federal court and most state courts, a
written report is mandatory unless otherwise stipulated or ordered
120
by the court. Although the expert’s identity must be disclosed as
Forensics Expert, SENSEI ENTERPRISES, INC. (2005), http://www.senseient.com
/articles/pdf/Finding_Wyatt_Earp.pdf.
116. Kyle Hightower, Anthony Computer Expert Backs Off Reported Claims, ABC
NEWS (July 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=14115919.
117. Order Granting Motion to Compel Discovery at 10, State v. Blount, No.
81-CR-09-1180 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010) (“The Court does not believe a
violation of this protective order is likely, as any violation by defense counsel could
adversely affect the attorney’s license to practice and a violation by [the digital
forensics expert] could result in loss of reputation and business.”).
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2009).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
120. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(B).
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part of the initial disclosures, “it is not uncommon for parties to
agree to a different disclosure date as part of a pre-trial scheduling
121
Sometimes even the disclosure of the expert’s identity is
order.
122
pushed off into the future per the scheduling order.”
As noted in a prior section of this Comment, Rule 26(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was recently amended to protect
123
Prior to the rule amendment, and
draft reports from disclosure.
in states that have not adopted similar provisions, it is this
examiner’s experience that the standard practice has been to
refrain from memorializing initial impressions in the form of notes
or draft reports until the examiner and attorney have taken the
opportunity to confer. If the examiner’s preliminary findings and
impressions appear to be unhelpful to the attorney’s theory of the
case, the attorney will usually halt further analysis and not call the
expert to testify. Likewise, if the examiner is using a tool that
includes case logging, such as earlier versions of AccessData FTK,
enabled by default, the examiner should be instructed as to when
124
and whether to disable it.
And although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to
discuss the structure of the expert’s report and all that it should
contain, a few words should be said about what the report should
not contain. The report should not be tailored to support a
125
particular outcome, as a material omission may constitute fraud.
Examiners must resist overtures by attorneys, however wellintended or abstract, to submit any testimony or work product that
is disrespectful of the truth, including overstating, understating, or
omitting findings. The findings, however, should be concise and
carefully circumscribed. The report should not volunteer an
overabundance of information, which may be vulnerable to
126
scrutiny under cross-examination. Further, all findings should be
121. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(2)(A) (requiring that witnesses intended to be used at
trial who will present evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705
(the specific rules that apply to expert testimony) be disclosed in the initial witness
disclosure required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)).
122. Bruce A. Olson, Preparing an Expert Report, DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATOR
NEWS, 1 (July 13, 2011), http://www.dfinews.com/article/preparing-expert-report.
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)–(C).
124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
125. Fraud is defined as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009).
126. See Olson, supra note 122, at 3 (“Avoid volunteering information that is
not specifically relevant. You are writing a report, not a thesis. If you volunteer
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accurately qualified as to the limitations of the particular tool(s)
used, the applicability of the current technology and industry
127
standard best practices, the methodology or techniques (such as
search criteria or formulae), and the scope of the investigation.
The scope of the investigation is not only limited by relevancy, but
128
also by budget (i.e., time), which almost always places legitimate
and significant constraints on what data is found or not found, and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Data not found has an important, often overlooked, place in
the report and may be as important (or more important) than what
was found.
When an examiner, through experience and
information generally accepted in the profession, expects to find
certain metadata (such as a browser internet history) or data to
which extant metadata refers—but does not find this metadata or
data—it should be so noted (also subject to the qualifications more
fully discussed hereinabove). The absence of this metadata or data,
whether in allocated (not deleted) or unallocated (deleted but
recoverable) areas of the media, must be attributed to automated
or manual processes, if possible. The examiner and attorney must
then confer to determine whether the absence is the result of
inadvertent spoliation, such as a defragmentation utility or
metadata removal tool used for legitimate data privacy purposes, or
intentional spoliation by the user.
D. Legality of Digital Forensics Investigation Techniques
Another important factor for consideration by both attorneys
and examiners in digital forensics investigations is the legality of
investigation techniques. Consider, for example, whether an
attorney or the examiner may take possession of a computer
too much, all you are doing is providing the opposing attorney with ammunition
to use in cross examination.”).
127. For example, at the time of this writing, there is some debate between
experts and vendors as to the methods for reliably recovering data from Microsoft
Windows 7 “shadow volumes.” The best practice, therefore, may evolve as the
technology is better understood, if Microsoft alters the technology through
patches, or if third-party products are able to alter or disable the feature.
128. See Kerr, supra note 36; see also NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 517 (“The .
. . attorney . . . should define the investigation’s goal or mission. All reports to the
[attorney] should start by stating this mission or goal, which is usually to find
information on a specific subject, recover certain important documents, or recover
certain types of files or files with specific dates and times. Clearly defining the
goals reduces the time and cost of the examination and is especially important
with the increasing size of hard drives and networks.”).
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belonging to a husband but seized by a wife in preparation for
marital dissolution proceedings. If a court finds that the wife did
not have equal dominion over the computer (e.g., if the computer,
or some portion thereof, was password-protected by the husband or
belonged to the husband’s employer), the taking of the computer
129
Likewise, evidence
for analysis might constitute a crime.
obtained from a keylogger or spyware deployed by the client or
examiner may violate state or federal law (e.g., the Stored
130
Communications Act).
Also, certain types of “cyber sleuthing” or penetration testing
may be unlawful under various state and federal statutes. For
example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, last amended in
2008, criminalizes anyone who commits, attempts to commit, or
131
Offenses include
conspires to commit an offense under the Act.
knowingly accessing without authorization a protected computer
(for delineated purposes) or intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization (for separately delineated purposes).
Practitioners should be aware that various statutory phrases, such as
“without authorization” and “access,” have been the continuing
132
subject of appellate review.
Yet another area of legality concerns recently enacted laws in
some states requiring digital forensics examiners to be licensed as
private investigators. Texas passed such a law that provides for up
to one year imprisonment and a $14,000 fine for persons
129. See Moore v. Moore, No. 350446/07, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5221, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding that a wife seeking a divorce could use
evidence she found on a computer taken from husband’s car just before she
petitioned for marital dissolution because the computer was a family computer—
not a work computer as alleged by husband—the taking occurred before the
commencement of the dissolution case, and husband’s car was considered the
family car). See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.89, 609.891 (2010) (proscribing
unauthorized computer access and theft).
130. Sean L. Harrington, Why Divorce Lawyers Should Get Up to Speed on
CyberCrime Law, MSBA COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:40 PM),
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2010/03/why-divorce-lawyers-should-get-upto-speed-on-cybercrime-law.html (collecting cases regarding unauthorized
computer access).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
132. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1996) (affirming the trial
court’s holding that the state did not prove the defendant committed a crime); see
also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1624–42 (2003) (showing how and
why courts have construed unauthorized access statutes in an overly broad manner
that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct involving
computers).
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133

conducting unlicensed computer investigations.
The attorney
employing a non-licensed expert may also commit a criminal
134
And Michigan’s new law makes unlicensed digital
offense.
forensics work a felony punishable by up to four years
135
In 2008, North
imprisonment, damages, and a $5,000 fine.
Carolina’s Private Protective Services Board proposed to amend
General Statute Section 74C-3 to include “Digital Forensic
136
Examiner” among the roles that must be licensed by the state.
137
Meanwhile, the American Bar
The measure was defeated.
Association has discouraged such legislation, observing,
“[c]omputer forensic assignments often require handling data in
multiple jurisdictions. For example, data may need to [be] imaged
133. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.104 (2011); see also Private Security Bureau
Opinion Summaries: Computer Forensics, TEXAS DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 4–5 (Aug. 21,
2007), http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/psb/docs/psb_opin_sum.pdf. The Opinion
clarifies that the Act applies to computer forensics, defined as:
[T]he analysis of computer-based data, particularly hidden, temporary,
deleted, protected or encrypted files, for the purpose of discovering
information related (generally) to the causes of events or the conduct of
persons. We would distinguish such a content-based analysis from the
mere scanning, retrieval and reproduction of data associated with
electronic discovery or litigation support services.
Id. at 4.
134. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.386 (2011); see also Joseph L. Lanza, Should
Your Next Expert Witness Be a Licensed Private Investigator?, 68 TEX. B.J. 118, 124
(2005) (discussing the Texas law, what it means to attorneys, who is exempt, and
potential problems that may arise).
135. 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 67.
136. Mack Sperling, North Carolina May Require Licensing for Computer Forensic
Consultants, but Do We Need It?, NORTH CALOLINA BUS. LITIG. REP. (Sept. 24, 2008),
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/2008/09/articles/discovery-1/northcarolina-may-require-licensing-for-computer-forensic-consultants-but-do-we-needit/ (reporting on proposed legislation and providing a draft at
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/uploads/file/Forensics%20Legislatio
n.pdf).
137. S. 584, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at
http://ncleg.net/Sessions/2009/FiscalNotes/Senate/PDF/SFN0584v3.pdf.
[The Bill] [a]mends GS 74C-3(b) to exempt from the definition
of private protective services a person engaged in (1) computer or digital
forensic services or the acquisition, review, or analysis of digital or
computer-based information, whether for the purposes of obtaining or
furnishing information for evidentiary or other purposes, or for
providing expert testimony before a court, or (2) network or system
vulnerability testing, including network scans and risk assessment and
analysis of computers connected to a network.
Id. at 1; see also North Carolina Statutes, LAWS.COM STATUTES,
http://statutes.laws.com/north-carolina/Chapter_74C/GS_74C-3
(exempting
digital forensic examiners) (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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from hard drives in New York, Texas and Michigan. Does the
person performing that work need to have licenses in all three
138
states?” The ABA Report concluded:
The public and courts will be negatively impacted if
e-discovery, forensic investigations, network testing, and
other computer services can be performed only by
licensed private investigators because not all licensed
private investigators are qualified to perform computer
forensic services and many qualified computer forensic
professionals would be excluded because they are not
139
licensed.
Indeed, very few licensed private investigators are qualified to
perform computer forensics services. At present, this commentator
observes that the trend seems to be leading away from state
licensing requirements and therefore is not likely to present a
problem for most litigators seeking to retain digital forensic
examiners.
Undoubtedly, one of the thorniest legal problems facing
litigators and examiners is that of child pornography
140
(“contraband”) encountered in digital forensics investigations.
141
As discussed in a prior section of this Comment, federal law
prohibits the knowing production, receipt, shipment, distribution,
reproduction, sale, or possession of any “visual depiction
involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct,” or of “any other material that contains an image of child
142
Violations are punishable by a mandatory
pornography.”
minimum term of imprisonment for five years and up to twenty
143
years, except for mere possession, which is punishable for up to
144
ten years. Further, Congress, in enacting the Adam Walsh Act of
2006, reasoned that child pornography as prima facie contraband
138. Whittemore, supra note 14, at 14.
139. Id. at 2.
140. See generally BERYL HOWELL, DIGITAL CONTRABAND: FINDING CHILD PORN IN
THE WORKPLACE, reprinted in WHITE COLLAR CRIMES 2008, ABA-CLE (2008), available
at
http://www.strozfriedberg.com/files/Publication/2ff70060-e3c5-43f8-bf98024a2b4b3509/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/412a1aa4-562b-402d-800d0097b96248b6/DigitalContrabandFindingChildPornintheWorkplaceWhiteCollarC
rimeProgram.pdf.
141. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(4)(C); Ambrogi, supra note 90.
142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a), 2252A (a) (2006).
143. Id. §§ 1466A(a)(2)(B), 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1).
144. Id. §§ 1466A(b)(2)(B), 2252(b)(2), 2252A(b)(2).
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should not be distributed to or copied by defendants, their
145
Therefore, an expert who encounters
attorneys, or experts.
contraband during an investigation outside of a law enforcement
facility must cease work and contact law enforcement to come to
146
the place of the investigation to seize the contraband. An expert
or attorney who e-mails or delivers the contraband may be
147
prosecuted for copying or distribution.
It should be noted that § 3509(m) does not apply to state
criminal proceedings; it expressly governs the Federal Rules of
148
Criminal Procedure. Although no Minnesota appellate court has
yet ruled on the issue, a Minnesota district court, relying on the
reasoning from appellate courts in Tennessee and Missouri, ruled
149
that it does not apply to Minnesota state courts. The court found
that the State did provide reasonable access but, in light of the
added costs of conducting the examination at law enforcement
150
facilities (“approximately doubling the cost”) and severe funding
cuts to the State Public Defender’s Office, “[i]t would not be in the
interests of the Public Defender’s Office and the criminal justice
system in general to have the Public Defender’s Office
unnecessarily expend additional funds to acquire the necessary
151
forensic examination.” Accordingly, the court ordered a forensic
copy be provided to the defense expert under a protective order,
145. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. §
501(2)(E) (2006).
146. NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 176 (“The evidence must be turned over
to law enforcement. This material is contraband and must not be stored by any
person or organization other than a law enforcement agency.”).
147. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739 (D.S.D. 2010) (indicting
an attorney—who claimed he was doing research for a potential client by
investigating the existence of child pornography on a P2P network—for possession
and distribution of child pornography); see also State v. Brady, No. 2005–A–0085,
2007 WL 1113969, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007) (recounting that—
notwithstanding a state court protective order—the Federal Bureau of
Investigation executed a search warrant on court-appointed defense expert’s
residence, the Bureau seized his computer and media, and the Government
threatened an indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A), rev’d on other grounds,
894 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio 2008).
148. Commonwealth v. Ruddock, No. 08–1439, 2009 WL 3400927, at *1 (Mass.
Supp. Oct. 16, 2009); State ex rel. Tuller v. Crawford, 211 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007); Allen v. Tennessee, No. E2007-01018-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 348555, at
*6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2009).
149. See State v. Blount, No. 81-CR-09-1180, slip op. at 6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7,
2010).
150. Id. at 7 n.2.
151. Id. at 9.
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which the court found would adequately serve the purpose of the
Adam Walsh Act “to protect children from sexual exploitation and
152
to prevent child abuse and child pornography.” Notwithstanding
the inapplicability of the Act to state court criminal proceedings,
and notwithstanding state court protective orders, the Government
has nevertheless prosecuted defense attorneys and experts for
153
contraband acquired in the performance of their official duties.
At least one federal district court has ruled that an attorney acting
in accordance with the state’s immunity statute may assert the
154
operation of the statute as an affirmative defense.
Arguably, there is merit to the argument that an expert should
have access to the evidence in his or her own lab, because of the
increased costs and inefficiencies of conducting the analysis at law
155
But, a useful analogy when considering
enforcement facilities.
whether a defense attorney should take possession of child
pornography is that, in a drug possession case, the prosecutor does
not keep samples of a controlled substance in the case files, and
instead must inspect the evidence under controlled conditions
where it is kept at the law enforcement facility.
E. Civil Liability Arising from Digital Forensics Investigation
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss
comprehensively the civil liabilities that could arise from digital
forensics investigations, certain examples are more obvious than
others. Under the Adam Walsh Act, any party that is “aggrieved” by
the distribution of child pornography (an activity that could be
undertaken by a careless, albeit well-intentioned, forensic

152. Id. at 10; see also Commonwealth v. Ruddock, No. 08–1439, 2009 WL
3400927, at *3 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009) (issuing protective order to prevent
“unnecessary disclosure”).
153. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 743 (D.S.D 2010); State v.
Brady, 894 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ohio 2008).
154. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
155. See Nelson et al., supra note 100 (“The beleaguered defense expert is
forced, often by economics, to do whatever it is possible to do in one or two eight
hour days. Frequently, the expert has to fight to use his/her own equipment and
to work in privacy.”); see also State v. Blount, No. 81-CR-09-1180, slip op. at 6
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010) (crediting expert’s testimony that conducting the
examination at law enforcement facilities would approximately double the cost);
United States v. Knellinger, 471 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647–48 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(crediting testimony that conducting examination at law enforcement facilities
would exacerbate costs).
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156

investigator) may bring a civil action for damages.
Another
example is invasion of privacy tort liability or civil liability under the
Stored Communications Act resulting from accessing an e-mail
157
And yet another
account or computer without authorization.
example is the possibility that an attorney who retains a careless or
158
In one
incompetent expert could be liable for negligence.
recent case, the incompetence of one party’s computer expert led
the court to find the party’s actions to be “grossly negligent, if not
159
In another,
reckless,” and issued an adverse jury instruction.
when the court queried the expert whether a potential discovery
problem could not be overcome by examining the “metadata,” the
expert made no response, prompting the court to observe that it
created “the firm impression that he was not familiar with a term
160
that we would expect a computer expert to know.”
F.

Prosecutor’s Interactions with Digital Forensics Examiners

Prosecutors have a few unique issues to contend with in digital
forensics investigations. One is the perception or allegation of
“shopping” for an expert, or reckless use of a tainted expert, which
161
may constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights and
may also be a violation of Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of
162
Professional Conduct (special responsibilities of a prosecutor).
The following interview excerpt from The Right to Expert Assistance in

156. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(f) (2006).
157. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07–11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6–7 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 6, 2008).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411, 413 (1965).
159. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 379 (D. Conn. 2007).
160. In re Search of 3817 W. W. End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
161. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 807 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff’d per curiam,
424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that reckless use of highly suspicious false
testimony violates due process); see also Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1506 (2007)
(“Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the DNA
exonerations that occurred in the 1990s concern the misconduct of prosecutors. . .
. [A] significant contributor to these miscarriages of justice was the misuse of
expert testimony. . . . The reckless use of a tainted expert should be considered a
due process violation.”).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010). But cf. Bennett L.
Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 17, 39
(2003) (“Personal sanctions against a prosecutor for deliberate misconduct, such
as civil liability and professional discipline, almost never happens.”).
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163

a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, illustrates this problem:
Because two police crime laboratories would not
declare a positive bootprint match in the infamous
Rolando Cruz prosecution, prosecutors sought out a third
expert, Dr. Louise Robbins, who declared a match. A
detective, who resigned because he believed the wrong
people had been charged, later observed:
“The first lab guy says it’s not the boot. . . . We don’t
like that answer, so there’s no paper [report]. We go to a
second guy who used to do our lab. He says yes. So we
write a report on Mr. Yes. Then Louise Robbins arrives.
This is the boot, she says. That’ll be $ 10,000. So now we
164
have evidence.”
Another less frequent issue may arise when a digital forensics
examiner encounters evidence during a non-criminal investigation
and reports the findings to law enforcement. If law enforcement
fails to obtain a warrant on probable cause to seize the media but
instead gives directives to the examiner to search for additional
corroborating evidence, the examiner may be regarded as
“deputized.” As an agent of the state, the examiner’s search—
absent a valid warrant exception—may be in violation of the
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights from unreasonable searches,
165
and any evidence procured therefrom may be inadmissible.
III. DIGITAL FORENSICS MAY FACILITATE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
166

Applying the so-called “Kovel Principle,” where the court
analogized an accountant to a translator whose presence would not
destroy privilege as if the lawyer was meeting with a client who did
not speak English, a digital forensic expert certainly facilitates a
lawyer’s ability to provide competent counsel. Just as technical
accounting concepts important to a representation may be like a
foreign language to the lawyer or the client, so too may the
technical concepts in a digital forensics context important to a
representation.
Indeed, preceding sections of this Comment have called
attention to ethical traps for the unwary when attorneys retain
digital forensics experts, but the decision not to retain a digital
163.
164.
165.
166.

89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305.
Id. at 1308–09.
NELSON ET AL., supra note 12.
See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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forensic expert at the appropriate time and for the appropriate
reasons also implicates ethical considerations, including Model
167
Federal Magistrate
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 and 1.3.
Judge John Facciola, during his keynote speech at LegalTech New
York in 2009, cited numerous examples of attorney incompetence
regarding information technology and e-discovery, recalling one
example from a child pornography case, where a defense attorney
reasoned, “You know Judge, I just don’t understand this computer
168
The magistrate concluded the defendant’s Sixth
stuff.”
Amendment rights had been compromised, and he said, “I can’t
think of a more obvious example of how ineffective the assistance
169
Another august commentator listed “lawyer
of counsel [was].”
incompetence,” at the top of his recent article, Ten Things that
170
Trouble Judges about E-Discovery.
Yet, expert incompetence has the same effect as attorney
incompetence on the outcome of cases and may compound the
problems by creating malpractice liability for the well-intentioned
attorney who retained the expert. Therefore, attorneys must
strategically select experts who are able to assure authenticity,
traceability, repeatability, data integrity, and confidentiality, all of
171
Moreover, an expert,
which ultimately leads to admissibility.
unburdened by the duty of advocacy, should be able to articulate
under cross-examination the protocols and procedures that led to
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009). Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to
provide “competent representation,” which is defined as “the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
Likewise, Rule 1.3 requires that a lawyer “shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” See also Saks, supra note 72, at 431. “If there
is scientific evidence that would help a party’s claim or defense, counsel ought to
find out about it and offer it. Failure to do so is a failure to provide competent
representation.” Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5
(“Thoroughness and Preparation . . . includes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual . . . elements of the problem.”)).
168. Interview by Karl Schieneman with Judge John Facciola, U.S. Magistrate
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., and Tom French, Solo Practitioner, (Mar. 2,
2009), available at http://www.esibytes.com/?p=371.
169. Id.
170. Craig Ball, Ten Things that Trouble Judges About E-Discovery, CRAIG D. BALL,
P.C., 1 (2010), http://www.craigball.com/TenTroublesEDD.pdf.
171. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D.
Md. 2007) (“[C]onsidering the significant costs associated with discovery of ESI, it
makes little sense to go to all the bother and expense to get electronic information
only to have it excluded from evidence or rejected from consideration during
summary judgment because the proponent cannot lay a sufficient foundation to
get it admitted.”).
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the findings in such a way that—in theory—can be repeated by
another similarly situated expert under the substantially similar
conditions, and lead to a substantially similar result.
The decision of when to retain such an expert is less difficult.
The first steps in digital forensics work, according to the Palmer
definition, are “preservation, collection, validation, [and]
172
For the lawyer dealing with a potential client or
identification.”
evaluating an adversary’s case, the first of these steps should instead
173
be
identification,
then
preservation
and
collection.
Identification is done preferably with the aid of an expert
174
but—
knowledgeable about probable sources of evidence,
depending on the fact scenario—is not always necessary.
Preservation, depending on the circumstances and the attorney’s
knowledge of potential sources of data, may be initiated by little
175
more than a litigation hold memorandum or an instruction to a
client to cease using a computer after the duty to preserve has
176
In one case frequently cited at e-discovery seminars,
attached.
the U.S. Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the
failure to issue a written litigation hold notice automatically
constitutes gross negligence, “even if it results from a pure heart
177
and an empty head.” In more complex scenarios, even where the
potential sources of data are known, an expert is needed to
172. Palmer, supra note 16, at 16.
173. EDRM Stages Explanation, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL,
http://www.edrm.net/resources/edrm-stages-explanation (last visited Sept. 5,
2011).
174. Jason Krause, Discovery Channels, 88 A.B.A. J. 4, 51 (2002).
175. A “litigation hold,” or “legal hold,” is defined by The Sedona Conference
Glossary as:
[A] communication issued as a result of current or reasonably
anticipated litigation, audit, government investigation or other such
matter that suspends the normal disposition or processing of records.
Legal holds may encompass procedures affecting data that is accessible as
well as data that is not reasonably accessible.
The specific
communication to business or IT organizations may also be called a
“hold,” “preservation order,” “suspension order,” “freeze notice,” “hold
order,” or “hold notice.”
See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 32.
176. The obligation to preserve evidence when a party “reasonably anticipates
litigation” is “well established.” Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “Once a party
reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ . . . .” Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
177. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
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establish how preservation should be accomplished (e.g., disabling
automated defragmentation on workstations in an enterprise,
disabling backup processes that overwrite older data, etc.), so that
the later collection effort will be fruitful. Conversely, self-collection
risks include under-collection, spoliation, changes to metadata,
178
chain-of-custody challenges, and authentication.
To avoid self-collection risks, many fact scenarios—even minor
179
tasks, such as forensically capturing a web page —warrant
retaining a digital forensics expert, unless the costs clearly outweigh
by the benefits. The decision to forgo an expert can lead to
missing important evidence recoverable only by a forensics expert,
alteration of the ESI or metadata, inability to establish a chain of
180
181
This examiner participated
custody, or criminal prosecution.
in one case where the entirety of the inculpatory ESI, which led to a
prompt settlement of the case, was located in “unallocated” areas of
the hard drive (i.e., deleted files), and which was recoverable only
with the use of specialized tools.
Finally, because lawyers must recognize their own competence
limitations regarding information technology, and take the
necessary time and energy to become competent or, alternatively,
178. Leonard Deutchman, Steer Clear of the Perils of Self Collection, LAW.COM (Apr.
16, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005508773&slreturn=1&
hbxlogin=1 (discussing the various risks of self-collection and ways to avoid them).
179. Mark Kerzner, Technology for Lawyers and Paralegals: Evidence
Authentication—Web Site Content, SHMSOFT BLOG (Sept. 1, 2008), http://
shmsoft.blogspot.com/2008/09/technology-for-lawyers-and-paralegals.html (“If an
item of evidence can be easily forged by a lay person, a developer, or a hacker, it is
inherently inadmissible, because it may not be what it purports to be.”); William R.
Wohlsifer, Internet Content Authentication, 1 E-COM. 10 (2001), available at
http://www.wohlsifer.com/publications.html (“Third-party authentication services
help overcome multiple objections to admissibility and always increase the weight
of the proffered evidence.”).
180. See, e.g., Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-372, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20353, at *19–20 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011). Defendants were assessed substantial
sanctions for “self-collection,” where the defendant employee solely responsible
for searching for and collecting relevant documents issued no litigation hold,
conducted no keyword searches for e-mail, and made no effort to communicate
with defendant’s IT department about how to electronically search documents. Id.
at *26–27.
181. United States v. Flynn, 709 F. Supp. 2d 737, 737 (D.S.D. 2010) (indicting
defendant for possession of child pornography because defendant decided to
undergo research in child pornography because one of his clients was accused of
pedophilia); see also Michelle Lore, Prosecution Serves as Warning, WISC. L.J. (Feb. 1,
2011, 11:48 AM), http://wislawjournal.com/2011/02/01/prosecution-serves-aswarning/ (“[Flynn may] stifle the availability of representation for people
confronting child pornography charges.”).
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182

consult experts in the field, the failure to do so may result in a
rule violation. Yet another risk of attorney self-collection is that of
the attorney becoming a fact witness, in violation of Rule 3.7, where
the attorney may be required to testify as to the collection,
preservation, and authenticity of ESI. Moreover, to the extent that
the attorney’s testimony in authenticating evidence implicates
communication with the client, it may endanger the attorney-client
privilege.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING CLOUD COMPUTING
AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Technologies affecting digital forensics investigations have
come and gone over the years. These include varying operating
systems, mobile devices, data storage size, data storage formats and
architectures, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and Internet-based
communications. Some of these changes have even given rise to
183
Nevertheless, the
predictions of “[t]he end of digital forensics.”
core technological principles of observation, repeatability,
traceability, and integrity have remained intact. Likewise, the legal,
professional, and ethical obligations of confidentiality and fiduciary
duties, as more fully discussed ante, have evolved relatively slowly.
But two recent, exploding trends are pushing technological and
ethical boundaries and necessitating novel approaches like never
before.
The first of these is so-called “cloud computing.” The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) defines cloud
computing as a “model for enabling convenient, ondemand [sic]
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources [(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services)] that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
184
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”
The U.S. Government Accountability Office defines cloud
computing as “an emerging form of computing where users have
182. See State Bar of Arizona, supra note 58.
183. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 39; see also Graeme B. Bell & Richard Boddington,
Solid State Drives: The Beginning of the End for Current Practice in Digital Forensic
Recovery?, 5 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS, SEC., & L. 3 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.jdfsl.org/subscriptions/JDFSL-V5N3-Bell.pdf (discussing that solidstate drives may destroy evidence without one telling them to do so).
184. The NIST Cloud Computing Project, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/states/maryland/posters/cloud-computing.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 5, 2011).
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access to scalable, on-demand capabilities that are provided
through Internet-based technologies, . . . [with] the potential to
provide information technology services more quickly and at a
185
lower cost, but also to introduce information security risks.”
Multiple cloud computing surveys reveal that, although some
enterprises remain apprehensive about entrusting their data to the
cloud, those that have already done so plan to increase their
186
presence.
Contrary to popular conception, cloud computing is not new.
Anyone who has used Hotmail since the 1990s was using cloud
computing. But it is novel as a widespread IT service delivery
system for corporate enterprises:
Cloud computing allows businesses and individuals to
use the Internet to access software programs, applications,
and data from computer data centers managed by [thirdparty] providers . . . . Cloud computing services are not a
unitary product but rather a continuum of services which
businesses are able to access on an as-needed basis. These
services range from “public cloud” services—that is, prepackaged standard services—to “private cloud” services—
that is, highly individualized services designed specifically
187
for a single client.
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-855T, INFORMATION SECURITY:
GOVERNMENTWIDE GUIDANCE NEEDED TO ASSIST AGENCIES IN IMPLEMENTING CLOUD
COMPUTING, 2 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10855t.pdf.
GARTNER,
186. 2011
CIO
Agenda
Findings,
http://www.gartner.com/technology/cio/cioagenda_findings.jsp (last visited
Sept. 5, 2011) (stating that although IT budget projects will remain flat in 2011,
almost half of all CIOs expect to operate their applications and infrastructures via
cloud technologies within the next five years); Dennis Drogseth, The Road to the
MGMT.
ASSOCIATES
(Feb.
2011),
Responsible
Cloud,
ENTERPRISE
http://www.enterprisemanagement.com/web/ema_ac0211.php (discussing that
companies can achieve the “Responsible Cloud” by using a step-by-step approach);
see also Dennis Drogseth, How to Make the Most of Cloud Computing without Sacrificing
MGMT.
ASSOCIATES,
3
(Sept.
27,
2010),
Control,
ENTERPRISE
http://www.businessandleadership.com/download/fs/doc/reports/howtom1.PDF (“In general, the survey respondents were strongly positive about Cloudcomputing related benefits, with 76% of those in deployment claiming real or
measurable financial benefits from Cloud.”); Press Release, Microsoft News
Center, Digital Infrastructure, Cloud Computing Transforming Fragmented
Manufacturing Industry Value Chain, According to Microsoft Study, (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2011/apr11
/04-03mscloudfragmentspr.mspx (“‘The survey shows . . . a growing number of
forward-looking companies are exploring new and innovative business capabilities
uniquely delivered through the cloud’ . . . .”).
187. IBM Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at
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Not only is cloud computing novel as a corporate IT service
delivery system, but the hardware used, which consists of virtualized
188
data centers, is also radically different today than even ten years
ago. Consequently, traditional computer forensics approaches are
likely to be stymied by both the data storage architecture and the
189
data delivery infrastructure.
We no longer have the ability to physically acquire objects
in these virtual environments where disks, memory, and
networks are shared, and traditional ownership
boundaries are blurred.
To date, there has been very little research done on
the current state of the tools, processes, and
methodologies to obtain legally defensible digital
190
evidence in the cloud.
In addition, other constraints have been identified by
commentators: the geographically disparate locations of the data
(often implicating multiple jurisdictions, some outside of the
191
192
These developments are troubling,
United States), and time.
*15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (citation omitted).
188. Aled Edwards et al., Diverter: A New Approach to Networking Within Virtualized
Infrastructures, 109–10 (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://conferences.sigcomm
.org/sigcomm/2009/workshops/wren/papers/p103.pdf.
189. John J. Barbara, Cloud Computing: Another Digital Forensic Challenge,
FORENSIC MAG. 2, http://www.forensicmag.com/article/cloud-computing-anotherdigital-forensic-challenge (last visited Sept. 8, 2011) (“Further forensic issues
concern the potential effect the cloud services could have on the digital data itself
and how the forensic examiner can explain, in a creditable manner, all these real
and potential indiscretions to the court. Many forensic examiners recognize that
‘there is no foolproof, universal method for extracting evidence in an admissible
fashion from cloud-based applications, and in some cases, very little evidence is
available to extract.’”) (quoting Andrew D. Frowen, Cloud Computing and Computer
Forensics, INTAFORENSICS (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.intaforensics.com/Blog
/Cloud-Computing-And-Computer-Forensics.aspx); Bernd Grobauer & Thomas
Schreck, Towards Incident Handling in the Cloud: Challenges and Approaches, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 ACM CLOUD COMPUTING SEC. WORKSHOP (2010);
Stephen D. Wolthusen, Overcast: Forensic Discovery in Cloud Environments, in FIFTH
INT’L CONF, ON IT SECURITY INCIDENT MGMT. & IT FORENSICS, Sept. 15–17, 2009.
But see Dan Morrill, Cloud Computing Making Forensics Easier, CLOUDAVE (Sept. 22,
2008), http://www.cloudave.com/2887/cloud-computing-making-forensicseasier/. Morrill contends that cloud computing makes forensics “easier” because,
when a party is served with a preservation letter, he or she can “easily backup [the]
environment and put it onto the cloud for the investigators to use, while the
normal course of business happens.” Id.
190. Scott Zimmerman & Dominick Glavach, Cyber Forensics in the Cloud, 14
IANEWSLETTER 4, 5 (2011), http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol14_No1.pdf.
191. Id. at 6; see also Cloud Computing & National Security Law, HARVARD NAT’L
SEC. RES. GROUP, 8 (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students
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because, as one commentator observed, “The cloud is now used to
store many of the same materials as a briefcase or backpack. Cloud
computing has added an ‘anywhere-access’ function to Internet
usage which provides a reasonable justification for storing private
193
In other words, data that has
materials in the cloud.”
traditionally been subject to forensic investigation is now being
rendered inaccessible in relative, practical terms.
At the time of this writing, this commentator believes data that
is recoverable only through digital forensics tools and practices, but
which may be in the custody of third-party cloud providers, is not
“reasonably accessible” as that phrase is used in Federal Rule of
194
First, third-party cloud
Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
providers would likely mount an obstreperous campaign against
any intrusion by digital forensics examiners into their proprietary
data warehousing. Second, the likelihood of retrieving residual
data from voluminous, distributed, virtualized, and shared storage
195
and might be further
area networks seems remote at best,
frustrated by an inhospitable third-party content provider (even if
the collection was authorized by court order). Third, the costs of
attempting to forensically retrieve residual data from a cloud/orgs/nsrc/Cloud.pdf.
192. Zimmerman & Glavach, supra note 190, at 6 (“Once the information
source is identified, do all involved entities have time synchronized via a consistent
time source such as Network Timing Protocol (NTP)? If a forensic expert has a
difficult time convincing your legal counsel that the time stamps from client-side
log files match time stamps on provider-side log files, the forensics will be difficult
to defend.”).
193. David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205,
2223 (2009) (citing Benjamin J. Romano, New Computing Strategy Sends Microsoft to
Clouds, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at A10).
194. The rule states that “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(B)(2)(B); see also
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION, at ii (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_
607.pdf (“Absent a showing of special need and relevance, a responding party
should not be required to preserve, review, or produce deleted, shadowed,
fragmented, or residual electronically stored information.”).
195. Zimmerman & Glavach, supra note 190, at 6 (“There may only be traces of
a virtual machine (VM) because the VM may reside on dispersed, internationally
located physical drives; data may have been deleted from a striped multi-disk array
unit; or forensics may reside within another cloud vendor storage system that
involves court orders to retrieve.”).
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computing content provider’s system (which costs are a matter of
rank speculation at this time) would doubtless serve as a deterrent
to most requesting parties or, alternatively, to a court applying the
196
Consequently, data recovery
proportionality doctrine.
concerning cloud computing content providers is likely to be
limited to warrants and administrative subpoenas for the near
future.
Just as some commentators urge, “Cloud computing is ‘as
197
important as the Web was 15 years ago,’” others observe, “The
198
world has embraced social networking with a fervor rarely seen.”
And so, the second of new technologies requiring special
consideration addressed by this Comment is social media. Social
media is familiar to many readers: the American Bar Association
reported in 2010 that fifty-six percent of lawyers surveyed
maintained a presence in an online social network, such as
LinkedIn, Facebook, or Legal OnRamp, compared with just fifteen
199
percent in its 2008 survey.
The methods of data recovery arising from social networking
are widely varied. Discovery of social networking sites “requires the
application of basic discovery principles in a novel context,”
because of the need to “define appropriately broad limits . . . on
200
Because much of
the discoverability of social communications.”
the data is stored in the cloud, the same challenges discussed above
apply to social media data collection. In addition, the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”) may create another hurdle,
requiring the user (often, the producing party), rather than the
201
With certain enumerated
service provider, to consent.
196. See Kerr, supra note 36.
197. Grant Gross, Cloud Computing May Draw Government Action, INFOWORLD
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/cloud-computingmay-draw-government-action-825 (quoting Mike Nelson, visiting professor for the
Center for Communication, Culture and Technology at Georgetown University
and a former tech policy advisor for U.S. President Bill Clinton, speaking at a
Google forum on the policy implications of hosted applications and services).
198. Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT
U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2010).
199. For a discussion of the American Bar Association’s report, see Robert
Ambrogi, ABA Technology Survey on Social Networking (Jul. 22, 2010), ROBERT
AMBROGI’S LAWSITES, http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2010/07/aba-technologysurvey-on-social-networking.html.
200. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind.
2010).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006); see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Facebook, MySpace, and Media
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exceptions, the SCA prohibits an electronic communications
services (“ECS”) provider from knowingly divulging to any person
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic
202
With regard to Webmail and private
storage by that service.
messaging, these forms of communications are protected by the
SCA, but with regard to Facebook “wall postings” and MySpace
comments, they may not be protected if the user’s privacy settings
203
allowed unrestricted access.
Nevertheless, by the time digital forensics investigators get
involved, it’s usually because the producing party could not or
would not produce data as obligated. And so, the good news for
litigators is that recovery from the service provider (either through
subpoena or forensic residual data recovery from the providers’
servers) is usually not necessary, as the data is likely available from
more accessible sources, especially mobile devices. Users of social
media need to use computers or mobile devices to access these
services and, therefore, the traces of that use are likely recoverable
using traditional digital forensics techniques from these computers
and mobile devices.
V. CONCLUSION
Expert witnesses have become an indispensible fixture to pretrial practice and procedure, as well as to jury trials. The
prevalence of ESI on personal computers, servers, mobile devices,
and the cloud, has significantly increased the need for competent
digital forensics experts in the roles of intrusion prevention,
incident response, and the preservation, collection, analysis, and
presentation of ESI in litigation. To make effective use of a digital
forensic expert, and to manage the risks of ethical, civil, or criminal
liability, attorneys must carefully supervise the expert without
overstepping professional boundaries. Further, digital forensic
experts benefit from having a robust legal background in order to
be of greater efficacy in their service to the bench and bar, but
should remain faithful to the vocation of neutral fact-finding. By
adhering to an adaptive framework of both separation-of-duties and
Temple are ECS providers for the purposes of the SCA).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(b) (2006).
203. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991. But see Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 656–57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). The court held that a user has no
reasonable expectation of privacy “notwithstanding her privacy settings” because
Facebook and MySpace did not guarantee “complete privacy.” Id.
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industry standard best practices, lawyers and digital forensics
experts will be well-suited to work effectively together, and to meet
the evidentiary challenges imposed by rapidly evolving technology.
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